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Under the FIDIC model, the employer is either the public- 
sector or a private entity, whereas in PFI projects in the UK only 
the public sector is using this route to build/finance 
infrastructure projects. The crucial factor, however, is that UK 
PFI deals are dependent on private funding; this means that the 
public sector's bargaining hand is weakened since private sector 
financiers will invariably want maximum protection for their 
investments. The structure of the deals is also very different 
since most PFI contracts are service-orientated. This means that
the construction part of the agreement is not the most 
important feature of the contract and therefore the negotiating 
position of the parties differs accordingly. @
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The selection of arbitrators: 
another view
by K V S K Nathan
In the January 1999 issue of Amicus Curiae, David Winter OBE of Baker & McKenzie 
in his article 'The selection of arbitrators' set out the process of choosing an 
arbitrator, which he divided into 12 points in his summary. Here, Dr K V S K Nathan 
responds to Mr Winter's article and expresses his own views on the topic.
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I read with interest the paper by David Winter OBE on 'The selection of arbitrators' in Issue 1 3 of Amicus Curiae (January 1999). I agree entirely with the author except for the fact 
that, under the conditions that exist in the real world, the 
selection of arbitrators is made by people with an imperfect 
knowledge of the individual arbitrators and the nature of the 
dispute. In my opinion, the focus should be on the process of 
selection rather than on the individual arbitrator. The selection 
process should be seen as fair and neutral and respect the 
autonomy of the parties in dispute. The product of this process 
would lead to an ideal arbitration, if not the ideal arbitrator.
By themselves, considerations of psychology of the individual 
arbitrator, bias and independence, leadership qualities and 
acceptability to all parties can mean different things to different 
people, or indeed mean little in a world of intrigue and interest 
groups and divisive politics. Appearances can be very deceptive. 
In the terms expressed in the article, the ideal arbitrator, or for 
that matter the ideal judge in a court of law, is an elusive creature 
of our imagination.
PARTY EXPECTATIONS
Since arbitration is the creation of the parties in dispute, one 
should look at the expectations of the parties themselves in the 
selection of an arbitrator or arbitrators. Obviously the ideal 
arbitrator would be one who would faithfully follow the wishes 
of the parties in regard to the expeditious conduct of the 
arbitration and making of the award This would be consistent 
with the goal of arbitration, namely a binding award in 
accordance with the laws and rules agreed between the parties in
dispute. However, there will be questions of fact as well as of law 
to be determined in an arbitration and, therefore, one has to 
accept that individual arbitrators, like individual judges in a court 
of law, can come quite honestly to different conclusions. There 
can be a whole range of value judgments to be made and 
arbitrators, like their counterparts in the courts of law, can vary 
widely in their perceptions of matters before them and of the 
credibility- of witnesses, but that does not signify bias one way or 
another or disqualify them from being arbitrators and judges. I do 
not think that we want arbitrators to be clones of one another.
From the perspective of a party in dispute, the ideal arbitrator 
would be someone who would hopefully support the party's case 
in the matter in dispute. Where the party has the right to 
nominate an arbitrator, it is bound to look for someone who will 
perceive and interpret the facts and law of the case in a manner 
favourable to the party concerned. The party would be 
interested not only in the arbitrator's background qualifications 
and experience but also his or her views as expressed in a variety 
of contexts, such as public statements, law journals, previous 
awards and so on. There is nothing wrong in a party selecting as 
arbitrator someone whom he or she thinks would be 
sympathetic to his or her case. That the arbitrator thinks one way 
or another is not always an indication of bias but rather an 
illustration of his or her powers of reasoning and intellect. 
Reading the criteria listed in the article, one might be tempted 
to think that it may be prudent for arbitrators to keep their views 
on issues of the day to themselves, because the devil one does not 
know would seem to be better that the devil one knows. That 
would be harmful to the whole adjudicatory process, where one 
is searching for the truth. Truth is most likely to be discovered
Amicus Curiae Issue 17 May 1999
by exposure to the scrutiny of those with varying views and 
standpoints and their interaction in a rational manner.
Unfortunately, arbitral proceedings conducted by single 
arbitrators may not provide the opportunity for this interaction, 
and the appointment can occasionally be a gamble in that the 
person chosen may prove not to have an open mind in regard to 
the matter before them. In the courts system the appellate 
process will provide the desirable scrutiny to correct any 
miscarriage of justice, albeit at different levels of the judicial 
process. There is some validity in the current thinking among 
arbitration circles that an appellate facility should be available in 
arbitrations, but that would increase arbitration costs which are 
already high. Under some national arbitration laws, the local 
courts exercise a degree of control over the conduct of domestic 
arbitrations and therefore, single arbitrators may be justified, at 
least in cases involving small sums of money. In international 
arbitrations, on the other hand, in the absence generally of an 
appellate facility, a multi-member tribunal should normally be 
preferred to a single arbitrator, as it reduces the chances of a 
binding rogue award.
Independence means only one thing: namely, that the 
arbitrator is a person capable of exercising his duties 
independently of any fallout from past or present relationships   
personal, professional or public   with the parties involved in the 
dispute and, in a multi-member tribunal, the arbitrators 
themselves should be capable of independent thinking and 
analysis without regard to past or present relationships infer se.
Closeness of relationship, such as being the spouse, parent or 
child of a parry or his chief counsel, is clearly a factor to be 
considered and is a matter that can easily be verified without 
resorting to any subjective evaluation. They are obvious grounds 
for disqualifying a nominee as arbitrator, but in some cultures 
where family, name, traditions and tics play an important role in 
public and private life, even remoter relationships may have to be 
tested. The evaluation of private professional relationships 
(because of the fact that arbitrators can, for example, also be 
successful lawyers or engineers or quantity surveyors in private 
practice) can be a thorny problem in an increasingly interactive 
world. In so far as international arbitrations are concerned, 
I would exclude consideration of professional relationships, 
except where the relationship is one of professional and client or 
employer and employee, or has been so in the recent past, and 
the conflict of interests is plain for the world to see.
To a lesser extent, the nature of relationships in a public 
capacity can also be reasonably verified, although such 
relationships may be advantageous to a nominee as arbitrator 
because of his or her awareness of the rules of fairness and due 
process in the exercise of his or her duties as a public servant. 
This accounts for a general acceptance that a government 
engineer in a department involved in a project, or a government 
lawyer, is qualified to be an arbitrator in a dispute arising out of 
* a contract where the government is a party. Unfortunately, even 
in the advanced democratic societies, bureaucrats and their 
political masters cannot always be trusted to act in an unbiased 
and impartial manner because often there is so much at stake for 
them personally in terms of power and money.
Institutional arbitral rules, such as those of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA), usually provide for final
approval of the parly nominees by the institutions themselves, 
but this power, in the interests of respect for party autonomy, 
should be exercised in a responsible manner and very sparingly.
I would question the emphasis given to some of the so-called 
psychological attributes of the arbitrator. I do not believe that a 
person who puts himself forward as an international arbitrator 
would not like to travel abroad. In any case, the arbitrator before 
accepting a nomination, would have weighed several 
considerations, including questions of travel abroad and visiting 
sites under difficult conditions and with few facilities. The 
person who is responsible for selection of an arbitrator should 
not substitute his own judgment in regard to this, because he 
may lose the services of an otherwise excellent arbitrator on 
grounds that can be mere conjecture.
Frequent travel and residence abroad is not proof that a 
person is comfortable with people from other countries and 
cultures and I do not see a connection between being socially 
comfortable with other peoples and being impartial and fair. 
Besides residence abroad can be used for and against a candidate 
for selection as arbitrator if, for instance, the dispute arises from 
a transaction in a country where the candidate has resided. Most 
Europeans when they live abroad tend to live in their own 
enclaves, socialise among themselves in their own clubs and 
interface with the locals (they used to call them natives), only 
infrequently at formal occasions if at all. One may be forgiven for 
thinking that a European who has not been abroad may be more 
open and impartial than someone who has travelled and lived in 
a developing country. Those who have lived abroad can develop 
a strong bias against the indigenous people. Generally they do 
not trust them, as is reflected in the higher standard of proof 
often demanded by international arbitrators from a party and 
witnesses from a developing country.
ACCEPTABILITY
Acceptability to all parties would necessarily apply to 
arbitrations conducted by single arbitrators but where a tribunal 
of more than one member is involved in the proceedings 
acceptability should not be a requirement unless the arbitration 
agreement or rules specifically provide for this. The practice in 
English domestic construction arbitrations for the parties to 
come up with a list of arbitrators rather than simply name their 
nominees is an attempt to weaken the autonomy of the parties. 
It should have no place in international arbitrations because it 
enables the stronger parry in terms of power and influence to 
prevail in the selection of arbitrators. It inevitably results in 
arbitrations being conducted by a narrow circle of arbitrators or 
could make the appointment of an arbitral tribunal a tortuous 
protracted process.
Provisions are made in all arbitration rules for the 
intervention of an appointing authority in the selection of 
arbitrators under certain circumstances. However, any invasion 
of a party's autonomy in the selection of arbitrators should be 
resisted, for the reason that a party and its counsel nominating 
an arbitrator would be doing so with a heavy heart and an acute 
awareness of the responsibility a nominee has to bear in the 
arbitration, the outcome of which will affect that party so 
intimately. Under modern arbitration rules, the party 
nominating should know that it would be an act of futility, if not
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folly, to nominate a person who is likely to be prejudiced and 
unreasonable, The arbitral rules will ensure that even under the 
worst choice of arbitrators, the arbitral process can be led to a 
successful conclusion.
One may be inclined to suggest, therefore, that special criteria 
should be applied to the selection of a chairman of a tribunal and 
that the co-arbitrators may be lesser creatures. I do not think 
that one can realistically search the four corners of the world to 
locate a paragon of virtue nor that character committees of 
professional bodies are the answer. The co-arbitrators should be 
encouraged to select their own chairman; they are going to work 
with him or her for a length of time and interact "at a personal 
level at the hearings and afterwards. The risk that the chairman 
will be a person of bias, lack independence and favour one side 
of the other, is slight, where in the selection of the co-arbitrators 
the autonomy of the nominating parties in the dispute is 
respected. The co-arbitrators will then ensure that the chairman 
would be an independent and neutral person at worst but 
sufficiently strong-minded to have the courage to exercise the 
unique powers given to him or her by modern arbitral rules.
LOGIC AND REASON
That leads me to the most valuable feature of arbitrators. They 
should tenaciously follow logic and reason and have the judicial 
acumen to be able to recognise when one side or the other has 
a stronger position in regard to a matter of fact or law. In other 
words, arbitrators should be chosen primarily for their 
intellectual and analytical skills. It is often said that we need 
arbitrators who are practical people who can 'sniff and tell' the 
right decision, but anyone who has been involved in major 
international arbitrations knows how much a case can depend 
on the interpretation of an ambiguous word or phrase and a 
misplaced punctuation mark, and equally how much a case 
depends on the study and in-depth analysis of facts and law. 
Hundreds of documents and reams of transcripts of oral 
testimony are involved. You need arbitrators who can interact at 
that level of intellectual effort and who are willing to expend 
their energies to prove, sift, analyse and cut to the truth in the 
mire of claims and counterclaims and conflicting oral testimony 
and documentary evidence that usually confronts them.
It is nice to think of an arbitral tribunal as being a collegial 
team, but one cannot avoid the bickering that inevitably goes on
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among equals, even in the loftiest of judicial institutions, and the 
egos of arbitrators can be very strong indeed. Edward Lazarus, a 
former clerk of the US Supreme Court, in his book Closed 
Chambers, describes the court as:
'[a] body of nine independent opinionated judges whose views in hard 
cases often prove irreconcilable must above all preserve a decency of 
process. For the system to work, jbr Justices in disagreement to achieve 
an exchange of ideas, undertake a search for common ground, or even 
reach an agreement respectfully to disagree, there must be trust and 
belief in mutual good faith. There must be a sense that reasons matter 
more than specific outcomes. '
An arbitral tribunal is not a social club and members of the 
tribunal do not have to conform, but it is imperative that, in the 
end, they are driven not by their private prejudices but by the 
cold facts before them and the logical and reasonable outcome 
under the law. Even then they may not all agree on particular 
facts and the law as applied to those facts, but unanimity is not 
a requirement under almost all arbitral rules.
However, for the credibility of the arbitral process, it is vital 
that before moving to a decision the chairman ensures that 
opportunity is given for opposing views to be fully heard during 
deliberations of the tribunal. I would borrow again from 
Mr Lazarus, who pointed out that:
'Justice Scalia,Jor example, has advanced the excellent idea that the 
Justices refrain from joining a draft majority opinion until the main 
dissent in that case has been circulated. Scalia's proposal, easily 
adopted, would have the salutary ejfect of promoting Jiiller consideration 
of opposing views.'
Arbitral tribunals may well profit from adopting a similar 
procedure, because the prior circulation of a dissenting minority 
opinion would have a sobering influence on the majority. 
Fortunately, in practice, the arbitral process is rarely affected by 
the views of one or more arbitrators.
CONCLUSION
To put it in a nutshell, my finding is that the process of 
selection of arbitrators should be based on a healthy respect for 
he autonomy of the parties in dispute. Arbitration is a creation 
of the parties in dispute and they are the most concerned that 
the arbitral proceedings are conducted in an expeditious, fair 
and impartial manner. The fact that disruption of the process 
inevitably results in increased costs should encourage most 
parties, except perhaps those rare parties with an agenda other 
than the resolution of the dispute they are involved in, to 
nominate arbitrators with the integrity to respect the arbitral 
process. They are ideal arbitrators regardless of the fact that the 
nominating party may have appointed him or her for reasons of 
self-interest. A party-nominated arbitrator may appear to be a 
biased person to the other side, but could nevertheless be an 
ideal arbitrator from the point of view of conducting a successful 
arbitration.
I believe that the parties can be relied upon to nominate the 
ideal arbitrators. I would expect them to choose arbitrators who 
would:
  believe in the arbitral process as a cost-effective alternative to 
the courts system to ensure that the proceedings are 
conducted expeditiously;
  have high intellectual and analytical skills, be prepared to 
expend the time and energy to examine thoroughly the case 
before them and be driven exclusively by logic and reason; and
  have the capacity to interact with their fellow arbitrators and 
the chairman in a rational manner.
A large measure of agreement is usually possible between 
logical and reasonable people. It goes without saying that, left to 
the parties, they will choose persons who also have some 
knowledge and experience in the subject matter of the dispute 
or in whom they have great confidence. They would be ideal 
arbitrators from my point of view, not because they would be 
paragons of virtue, but because their product would be an ideal 
arbitration. ©
Dr KVSK Nathan
.Barrister/arbitrator, Italy
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